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I 
Historians have drawn attention to the emergence of an Atlantic trading 
community during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and pointed to 
the underlying importance of the primary means of communication - ocean 
shipping. Studies have appeared in Europe and the United States devoted 
to the general growth and development of maritime activity and to the ways 
and means of measuring and comparing its several elements: profitability, 
changes in productivity, freight rates, and capital costs. 1 No one has yet 
extended his examination to include French maritime activity to New France 
in any but the most general manner. This study is an attempt to add to an 
already large body of literature on ocean shipping, and to indicate some of 
the differences between the conclusions that have been drawn concerning 
the British American colonies and similar developments in New France. 
It appears that there were important variations. The evidence for such a 
study is meagre and, in the absence of data, does not lend itself to quantita-
tive measurement. It may therefore be useful to present the information 
about one voyage for which there is sufficient information to draw some 
conclusions about the state and conditions under which maritime traffic 
was carried on in France's northern colony. 2 
* Department of History, Queen's University. 
1 Among recent studies are the monumental work of P. and H. CHAUNU, 
Seville et /'At/antique (1504-1650), 12 vols. (Paris, 1955-60); B. and L. BAILYN, Massa-
chusetts Shipping, 1697-1714: A Statistical Study (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); J. M. 
HEMPHILL II, "Freight Rates in the Maryland Tobacco Trade, 1705-62," Maryland 
Historical Magazine, LIV (1959), 36-58 and 153-87; R. DAVIS, The Rise of the English 
Shipping Industry in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (London, 1962); P. DAR-
DEL, Navires et Marchandises dans les ports de Rouen et du Havre au XVlll' siecle 
(Paris, 1963); J. DELUMEAU, Le Mouvement du port de Saint-Malo 1681-1720, bilan 
statistique (Paris, 1966); more recently J. F. SHEPHERD and G. M. WALTON, Shipping, 
Maritime Trade and the Economic Development of Colonial North America (Cam-
bridge, University Press, 1972), have used a theoretical framework in their explanation, 
as have G. Paquet and J. P. Wallot in several recent articles in the Revue d'Histoire 
de l'Amerique franfaise . 
2 The Admiralty archives for the port of Quebec were returned to France 
after 1760 and subsequently lost. See "Introduction" to L. G. VERRIER's "Proces-verbal 
de l'etat des registres des greffes du siege de l'Amiraute de Quebec," in Rapport de 
l'archiviste de la province de Quebec, 1920-21, pp. 106-31. Jean Meyer has noted that 
"L'examen d'une campagne maritime isolee est fallacieuse: alors que les benefices assu-
res par !es 'retours' courent, le capital, aussitot reinvesti, est deja redevenu productif. 
C'est le phenomene cumulatif par excellence qui, pour etre vraiment superieur aux 
placements tradition.nels, doit s'effectuer dans !es delais !es plus courts possibles;" see 
L'Armement nantais dans la deuxieme moitie du XVJJJ• siecle (Paris, !1969), p. 222. 
But despite this warning the rarity of data relating to New France, and the commonly 
held view that enormous profits were made in maritime trade to New France 
continues to justify this attempt to analyse the results of a shipping venture to Quebec. 
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Several documents recently discovered among supplementary volumes 
of the "juridiction consulaire" in the departmental archives of the Charente-
Maritime at La Rochelle were collated with a waste-book in the same 
records to provide the information for the present study. 3 The brouillard 
or "waste-book" was used by merchants to keep rough preliminary entries 
of commercial transactions. In this instance it consists of forty-seven closely 
written pages of chronologically recorded purchases and other expenses made 
from 1724 to 1 728 to refit and furnish a merchant vessel for a voyage to 
and from Quebec. 
The record is important for the period it covers: in no decade during 
the ancien regime are the port records so scanty as that prior to 1725. At 
La Rochelle they are virtually non-existent; at Quebec, the years following 
the death of Louis XIV were very poorly covered by ministerial records, 
for during the regency the old secretariats were abolished in favour of less 
efficient councils. 
The notebook contains several lists including one of the crew, another 
of the cargo put on board by the owners, a record of its sale at Quebec, 
another of cargo laded at La Rochelle for other metropolitan merchants, 
and also accounts of cargo purchased in the colony for the return voyage 
and its later sale at La Rochelle. A great deal can be found wanting in the 
notebook. The careless manner in which entries were sometimes made and 
withdrawn, the use of the backs of folio pages to record later accounts of 
expenditures after the initial departure and the errors in arithmetic have 
all made for confusion. They point to it as a running draft and not a final 
record. Consequently, several given totals and sub-totals are useless for 
analytical purposes. Only the raw data in this and other documents have 
been used in the paper. 
Despite its flaws, the source has great significance. Among the French 
colonial records concerning New France it is perhaps unique in its wealth 
of detail. It reveals some of the intricacies of ship ownership, the tasks of 
an outfitter, the nature and cost of materials and labour employed, as well 
as the size, composition and wages of a French crew. It also provides 
information about the manner in which cargo shipped to Quebec was 
estimated, consigned and loaded; and finally, it allows us to examine the 
relations of these many elements and to indicate to some degree their effect 
upon the ship's ability to earn profits. 
The ship, the Fier, of 140 tons burden, was typical. There seems 110 
reason to believe that her voyage to New France was in any way out of the 
ordinary or that the picture that emerges from the record does not reflect 
a Archives departementales de la Charente-Maritime [hereafter A.C.M.], SCrie B, 
volume 3'55, is the designation of the brouillard; fourteen other documents were found 
in the same series, bundles no. 4202 and 4203; these consisted of captain's instructions, 
receipts, lading bills and current accounts which all served to confirm and clarify many 
of the entries written in the waste-book. 
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the normal procedures in commercial shipping between La Rochelle and 
Quebec. In every respect the record seems to concern the business activities 
of typical Rochelais merchants engaged in the most common sort of Canadian 
colonial activity involving an ordinary ship, crew and cargo. 
The owners of Fier were engaged in trading on their own account as 
well as in shipping. In the Quebec colonial trade this was the most common 
procedure. Canada produced no bulk cargoes to warrant the use of charter-
parties, wherein merchants hired ships from their owners for the delivery 
or collection of a cargo. In later years numerous ships arrived in the colony 
under charter, but almost always to the government or its agents for trans-
porting troops, munitions and supplies. Before the outbreak of the Anglo-
French wars in the middle of the eighteenth century such passengers and 
cargoes were most often carried to New France by the single naval transport 
which called annually. The vast majority of merchantmen sailed under the 
same circumstances as did the Fier. The record, then, reflects the common 
experience of both colony and metropolitan ports in the years before and 
after 1725. Unfortunately, the interrelationship between the owners' shipping 
and trading activities makes it difficult to draw conclusions solely about 
maritime operations. This itself, however, is an important conclusion about 
colonial shipping to New France. 
II 
The men who outfitted the Fier were no strangers to ocean shipping, 
the colonial trade or to New France. Andre Estournel, the author of the 
waste-book, had been sending goods to Quebec at least since 1711. At that 
time his nephew and later co-owner of the Fier, Jean-Jacques Catignon, son 
of a former stores-keeper at Quebec, resided in the colony, receiving trade 
goods from France and sending back bills of exchange in return. 4 Four 
years later Catignon was in partnership with a Sieur Guillet, a colonial 
merchant. 5 In 1718 Estournel purchased a one-third interest in a merchant-
man. During the next few years the ship sailed regularly to New France 
carrying cargo for the owners and other merchants. In the fall of 1723 
after departing Quebec, the ship gave out and was forced to return and 
winter in the colony. 6 Probably the news of this moved Estournel to 
4 A.C.M., B 4202, Balance sheet of Catignon's account with Estournel from 
July 25, 1711 to July 17, 1712; also, he was probably the same Jean-Jacques Catignon 
who rented a room in lower town Quebec in 1713, lnventaire des grefjes des notaires 
du reRime franfais, ed. A. RoY, tomes XVIII and XIX, Louis Chamballon (Quebec, 
1960-64), XIX, 425-6; see also A. GODBOUT, "Families venues de la Rochelle en 
Canada," in Rapport des Archives nationales du Quebec, tome 48, 1970, p. 170, for 
information that through marriage in 1714 Catignon became a brother-in-law of the 
Montreal merchant, Pierre Charly. 
5 A.C.M., B 4202, Bill of Lading, 11 May, 1714; and B 4203, invoice, 
17 April, 1717. 
6 A.C.M., B 5715, no. 29, "declaration de presence," 14 June, 1718; B 4202, 
crew rolls for 1721 and 1723. While in Quebec during the winter of 1723 the captain 
became involved in a law suit regarding the payment of the crew's wages, lnventaire 
des jugements et deliberations du conseil superieur de la Nouvelle-France de 1717 a 
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purchase a new hull. In March, 1724, he paid 4,600 livres to M. de Mau-
lusson, an agent of a f ermier-general, for a patache that had been used on 
the he de Re, 7 and subsequently named it the Fier. 
Estournel met most of the costs, but the same day that he purchased 
the ship, Catignon made over to him a bill of exchange worth 2,820 livres 
10 sols, and a year later transferred several accounts to meet some of the 
mounting costs. Before the ship left La Rochelle, Catignon had paid his 
associate a little less than one-quarter of the total capital outlay to that date. 
The third and major interest holder was a somewhat enigmatic M. de Courcy 
who may have been a naval officer. In 1718 a Chevalier Pothier de Courcy 
had commanded His Most Christian Majesty's frigate, Mutine, on a voyage 
to Quebec. There had been insufficient funds in the marine treasury that yen 
and the ship had been outfitted by a private merchant from La Rochelle. 8 
This experience may have convinced Courcy of the profits to be made from 
similar ventures and led him six years later to invest in the refit and voyage 
of the Fier. 
Like Catignon, Courcy also put up some cash soon after the original 
purchase in order to meet the current expenses of the refit. Throughout the 
year he continued to pay for various materials used and before the ship 
sailed he had contributed almost one-third of the total investment. Estournel, 
himself, contributed the remainder. The total of 24,816 livres 3 sols does 
not represent any final figure but illustrates the approximate investment 
required to get a ship of 140 tons burden ready for sea, and the flexibility 
of the financial arrangements needed. A more accurate and useful presenta-
tion of the capital outlay is presented in Tables I-III. 
The sums contributed in the initial venture by each of the owners over 
the fourteen months following the purchase represented both the investment 
in the ship and a portion of its cargo. Although it is well known that 
individuals most often owned only portions of different vessels in order to 
spread the risk of financial loss and to limit the liability of their total 
investments, it is apparent that no shares in the vessel were sold. Estournel 
made the initial purchase of the hull but that did not prevent Catignon 
from paying for the construction of the ship's figure head and for some of 
the victuals, or Courcy from contributing the ship's longboat, twenty empty 
barrels, several more of nails, tallow and a set of blocks and pullies. The 
three men owned the ship jointly. 
1760, par P. G. Rov, 7 volumes (Quebec, 1932-35), I, 191, 201; also Archives nationales 
[hereafter, A.N.], Colonies, Cl lA, XL VII, f. 144 and F3 , f. 418 also contain references 
to this ship. 
7 Encyclopedie, ou dictionnaire raisonne des sciences, des arts et des metiers, 17 
vols. (Paris, 1755-74), Vol. XII, 159, defines patache as a stationary ship used as lodgings 
and offices by clerks of the fermier-general charged with visiting, entering and departing 
ships for purposes of collecting duties and examining passports. 
s A.N., Col. Cl1A, CXXIV, piece no. 74, Decision du Conseil de Marine, 
3 May, 1718; and ibid., XXXIX, f. 3, Vaudreuil and Begon to the minister, Quebec, 
4 October, 1718, for a report of the ship's arrival at Quebec. 
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No declaration of ownership has been found, but a single entry in the 
waste-book and the discovery of two current accounts drawn up later between 
Estournel and his partners' widows provide the key to ownership. Initially 
Estournel and Catignon each held one-quarter interest in the ship while 
Courcy and a Richard Gauthier held five-twelfths and a one-twelfth interest 
respectively. Before sailing, however, Gauthier dropped out, and the three 
partners split his holding equally between them. 9 
The details of ownership noted part of the total investment in the 
venture, but it is important to see what this total amount consisted of in 
order to obtain an estimate of shipping production costs. The generalized 
and imprecise nature of some of the amounts given in the waste-book are 
a hindrance to accurate calculation and several accounts for work done 
and materials bought were not paid for until after the ship had departed 
La Rochelle thereby adding to the total capital outlay. Nevertheless a list 
of items including more than three hundred entries has been drawn and 
arranged in several categories to attempt to reveal the fixed and replacement 
costs which, along with the investment in cargo, made up the total capital 
outlay in the venture to New France. 
The Fier did not undergo a normal armament for the colonial trade. 
Before it was purchased by Estournel it had been moored in the harbour 
on the tie de Re. Much of her hull timber was unfit for the high seas. 
The ship had to undergo a major refit which took more than a year to 
complete. One may discern the ship's original condition in the list enumerat-
ing beams, knees and futtocks, the thousands of running feet of deck and 
hull planking, a new bowsprit, a mainmast and three new topmasts. More 
than 2,135 man-days of labour were expended on her, 1,469 man-days by 
carpenters alone. The ship was practically rebuilt. 
The capital expended represented considerably more than a normal 
armament which would have entailed only victualling, advances to the crew 
and replacement of worn out material: sails, rigging, running gear and 
planking where necessary. The totals in Tables I-III represent the capital 
invested in a nearly new ship of one hundred and forty tons burden. 10 A 
9 On page 18 of the waste-book appears the following, "Les 5 douzieme a 
Mr. de Courcy est de 11 ,854 819; 2,370 17/9 p[ou]r la 12• de M. Gautier que nous 
avons pris par tiers." These figures indicate that the Fier was valued at 28,450 livres 
13 sols. Thus, Gautier removed himself before the outfit was completed. 
10 A.C.M., B 4202, The burden of the Fier is noted on a lading bill signed by 
the captain for the owners' cargo, 22 May, 1725. Nothing is more difficult to unravel 
than the units of measurement used during the ancien regime. Historians have 
confounded the problem by confusing displacement, tonnage and weight. Tons burden, 
dead-weight tonnage and capacity are synonymous terms. They are the units used in 
this paper where tons refers to tonneaux de mer of 2,000 French pounds. In 1681 
the Ordonnance de la Marine fixed the volume equivalent of this unit at forty-two 
French cubic feet although a ton weight of wine does not fill quite twenty-eight cubic 
feet. One explanation assumes that a ship's load was two thirds its capacity to carry 
it; hence forty-two cubic feet of interior space was needed for each ton of weight 
carried. For further details see the very good articles by Paul GILLE, "La jauge au 
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portion of this amount was considered along with the crew's wages, victuals 
and incidental contingency expenses as a replacement cost rather than as 
part of the fixed cost of the total capital outlay. It is difficult, however, to 
determine what portion of this total is replacement cost. By subtracting the 
sum of the replaceable items in the expenditures: rigging, running gear, rope, 
cordage, sails, artisan labour and other miscellaneous expenses, one may 
reduce the fixed element in the total capital outlay to 15,789 livres 5 sols 
6 deniers. This final sum is an estimate of the cost of building a ship as 
opposed to making it ready for sea. Equally important it represents the 
amount of capital investment, minus the depreciation that remained to the 
owners after the ship returned from her voyage to Quebec. 
In 1725 the cost of a relatively new merchantman of 140 tons burden 
amounted to approximately 15,790 livres, or 113 livres per ton. Using an 
approximate currency equivalent of one livre to one shilling sterling, this 
amount compares very favourably with the estimated peacetime price of 
6Yz pounds sterling per ton for an English ship of similar size, considering 
only the fixed element in the price. 11 The two figures would be even more 
comparable if the true replacement cost were known. 
It is all too easy to forget just how much of a wooden ship needed 
replacing after a single trans-ocean voyage. Suits of sails, rope, blocks and 
spars were in need of replacement. Rope alone for the Fier represented 
nearly eight percent of the capital outlay necessary to ready the ship for 
sea and twenty percent of the total replacement expenditure. Following the 
ship's return to La Rochelle Estournel sold 2,736 livres weight, or between 
one-quarter and one-fifth of the rope used during the voyage, to oakum 
pickers but this act represented only a small return on a large investment. 
Similarly, all of the ship's running gear had to be replaced, but probably 
at less frequent intervals than after every voyage. 
Which of the many expenditures ought to be classified as fixed or 
replacement ? It is obvious that the above subtraction of the total cost of 
items which needed replacement errs on the side of excess. Using the 
English figure given above, a ship of 140 tons burden had a fixed cost of 
18,200 livres. The fixed cost of the Fier was probably somewhat higher 
than the 15,789 livres determined. 
The total replacement cost, however, consisted of more than the replace-
able items in the ship. The crew had to be paid and victuals provided. It is 
from the sum of the fixed cost and the total replacement cost that the 
ship's earnings were determined, but in the case of the Fier the owners also 
XVIII" siecle," in M. MOLLAT, ed., Les Sources d'histoire maritime en Europe (Paris, 
1952), pp. 465-70; and F. C. LANE, "Tonnages, Modern and Medieval," The Economic 
History Review, 2nd Series, XVII (1964), 213-33. 
11 R. DAVIS, "Earnings of capital in the English Shipping Industry, 1670-1730," 
Journal of Economic History, XVII (1957), 410. This essay has been a constant guide 
in the preparation of this paper. 
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purchased a cargo worth 9,781 livres 2 sols 8 deni.ers and loaded it onboard 
for the voyage. A statement of their total capital outlay appears in Table IV. 
Two features of these totals and sub-totals are not altogether obvious. 
First, the replacement cost per ton is much less than the fixed cost per ton. 
The Fier's replacement cost amounted to approximately 66 livres per ton 
(see Table IV) which again is somewhat less than the equivalent figure of 
4Yi pounds sterling for a similar English vessel. 12 Second, taking the round 
figure of 25,000 livres as the cost of making the ship ready for sea, one 
finds a ratio of 3: 2 between fixed costs and replacement costs. In other 
words, a French colonial merchantman of median tonnage required about 
1 79 livres per ton of capital investment when undertaking a voyage to New 
France. 13 This figure probably holds good only for the period of peace and 
growing financial stability following 1725. 
The accuracy of the figure for Total Capital Outlay (Table IV) is, of 
course, open to question but it is remarkably close to the given total of 
35, 173 livres 4 sols 8 deni.ers which appeared in Estoumel's waste-book as 
the total amount involved in the purchase, refit, armament and cargo on 
which he levied a commission of two percent for services rendered to the 
association. 14 The difference between the two totals is 1.1 percent. Even 
if the figures are not strictly accurate, however, the general principle they 
illustrate remains valid, and they lead to some suggested conclusions about 
colonial shipping using very limited amounts of data. 
III 
On May 25, 1725 the Fier departed the roads at La Palisse for Quebec 
where she arrived on August 22 after a normal crossing of ninety days. 15 
As usual she carried a greater complement than either English or Dutch 
ships of a similar siz.e. The Fier's inefficiency can be seen by comparing the 
ton-man ratio of 6.1 with those for unarmed English merchantmen of similar 
siz.e that sailed from England to Jamaica in 1729-31 and to Charleston in 
1735-39, which are 8.8 and 11.9 respectively. 16 The larger French crew 
may be explained by different and less efficient hull and rig design, but 
12 Ibid., 410. 
13 A similar calculation for a 16-0-ton merchantman, bought and outfitted at 
Bordeaux in 1725 for 28,805 livres 10 sols would give the same livres-ton ratio, 
179 livres 9 sols. In this case, however, the ratio of purchase price to outfitting costs 
was closer to 4: 1 (see J. CAVIGNAC, Jean Pellet commerrant de gros 1694-1772: contri-
bution a l'etude du negoce bordelais du XVI/I" siecle (Paris, 1967), p. 48). 
14 Brouillard, f. 22. This differs slightly from the figure of 34,597 livres 518 
that appears on f. 18 of the same. 
15 A.N., Col. CllA, XLVII, f. 308v for date of arrival. 
16 See SHEPHERD and WALTON, Shipping, Maritime Trade and the Economic 
Development, pp. 201-3. Fier's ton-man ratio is low even when compared to those for 
five ships of similar siu that sailed to Quebec from La Rochelle between 1676 and 
1687 ! (See A.C.M., SCrie B, 5675:210; 5679:3811; 5682:391; 235:1107 and 137.) During 
the later portion of the eighteenth century ships of similar tonnage entering Quebec 
from England were much more efficient. See G. PAQUET and J. P. WALLOT, "Interna-
tional Circumstances of Lower Canada, 1786-1810: Prolegomenon," Canadian Historical 
Review, Liii (1972), pp. 396-99. Table V, "Tons per Man on Ships in and out of 
Quebec by Ship's Size and Origin or Destination, 1786-11810." 
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more likely by regulation from the era of Colbert and his successors. The 
Ordonnance de la Marine required commercial vessels to ship various 
inexperienced personnel as trainees. 17 The case of the Fier proved to be no 
exception. Besides the captain there was a second in command, six petty 
officers, a surgeon, ten seamen, two boys, a cook and a pilot in training for 
a total complement of twenty-three. All, with the exception of the pilottin, 
were paid a monthly wage and even he received a bonus at the end of the 
voyage adding to the already large expense for food and wages that such a 
crew required. 
The salary scale varied widely. The two ship's officers each received 
one hundred and ninety livres per month, which set them well above the 
remainder of the crew. The pilot, boatswain's mate and ship's carpenter 
were each paid forty-five livres. The other petty officers, the bosun, coxswain 
and steward were paid between thirty and thirty-four livres monthly while 
the surgeon with twenty-eight livres was ranked very low. His replacement 
on the return voyage - for the first one deserted at Quebec - received an 
even lower wage. 
The surgeon was one of the crew members required by law on all 
French ships, but he seems to have been treated almost as though he wete 
superfluous. Others, too, were so treated, if one may judge from the disparity 
between the wages and special treatment given to three seamen and the 
remainder. At the beginning of the voyage the three highest paid sailors 
received a bonus of one week's wage for signing on and at the conclusion 
they were paid off at a higher rate than the one originally set. There were 
no formal distinctions in France between able and ordinary seamen but the 
wide range . in rates of pay among the deck hands does reflect the degree 
of skill among them. Ordinary seamen earned monthly rates of pay between 
sixteen and twenty-two livres. Two others earned two livres more per month 
while the senior crewmen had their rate of pay increased to twenty-seven 
livres for each of the last four months of the voyage. These men were paid 
for the complete· voyage almost three times the rate for boys in training. 
Along with the boastwain, who received the highest wage of those serving 
on deck, they provided the backbone of the crew. 
The crew were paid for the full time away from La Rochelle, and the 
long lay over spent by most ships at Quebec ate into the ship's earning 
capacity. The long delays often encountered in the St. Lawrence River 
where captains were forced to wait for the proper winds before moving 
upstream also served to increase sailing time. These two factors combined 
to make the New France run more costly than others in the French colonial 
network, especially as the increased cost of the large crew's wages and 
victuals was a part of the replacement cost of capital outlay or was charged 
against earnings before profit could be taken. One month's wage for this 
17 P. W. BAMFORD, Forests and French Sea Power, 1660-1789 (Toronto, 1956), 
p. 166. 
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oversized crew represented almost two percent of the owner's total capital 
outlay (see Table XII). 
The absence of any commission or bonus paid to the captain who sold 
the owners' cargo at Quebec is surprising. Usually such activity entitled a 
captain to a percentage of the gross sales but there is no record of it in this 
case. This appears to have been the captain's first voyage for the owners 
and they may have placed him on salary for that reason. Certainly their 
instructions to him suggest that he lacked experience : several persons at 
Quebec were recommended to him in case he needed advice. 18 
Before leaving La Rochelle the crew received two months' advance on 
their wages; when signing-on bonuses were added, this amounted to 1,416 
livres. On the ship's return nearly seven months later the remaining wages 
were paid and the crew dismissed. The whole amount of their wages came 
to 4,735 livres 10 sols and with the cost of their victuals was deducted from 
the ship's earnings. These figures show how the expense of large crews 
might reduce the earning power of French ships. The owners endeavoured 
to increase their earnings by other means such as, for example, the practice 
of returning from Quebec with specie and coin as a result of trading activity. 
It was used to pay off the crew at La Rochelle and thereby avoided the 
necessity for the merchants to tie up any more capital for that purpose 
than what had been required for the initial outlay. 
IV 
The Fier carried approximately one hundred and thirty tons of cargo 
and more than ten tons of victuals for her crew. In France, and on this 
voyage, the various bales, packets, bundles and barrels of merchandise were 
estimated by the shipper into standard volumes of barriques, tier~ons, quarts, 
ancres and demi-ancres, representing a quarter, sixth, eighth, sixteenth and 
thirty-second of a tonneau de mer respectively. For instance, one consign-
ment of two ballots, two caissons, four pacquets and one baril was estimated 
as four barriques, two tier~ons, one quart and a demi-ancre, or one and 
forty-seven ninety-sixths tons of freight. 
These freight-tons were the units recorded by port officials on the 
arrival and departure of ships of the period. The totals of these figures 
reveal the amount of cargo imported and exported, not the tonnage of 
shipping entering the port. On her arrival at Quebec in 1725 and again 
four years later the Fier was reported carrying one hundred and thirty and 
one hundred and twenty tons respectively. 19 The historian cannot, then, 
assume that a ship always carried full ladings and he must consider the 
differences between potential and real load when relating the requirements 
18 A.C.M., B 4203, "Ordre pour le capitaine Chiron Jorsque Dieu Jui aura 
conduit a Quebec," 24 May, 1725. 
19 A.N. , Col. CllA, XLVIJ, f . 308v; A.C.M., B 247, f. 1,J5v; and Ministere 
de la France d'outre mer, Serie G 1, 464, no. 1. 
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for capital outlay to the earnings to be made based on freight and cargo 
carried. Fortunately in the present case the cargo space appears to have 
been filled so that no additional calculations concerning real and potential 
earnings needed to be made. 
The owners' cargo was largely wine and brandy but also included salt, 
vinegar and household wares (see Table V). It filled less than seventy tons 
of cargo space. Estournel hired out a bit more than sixty tons of remaining 
space at one hundred livres per ton to other merchants who wished to consign 
goods to agents and merchants at Quebec. Eleven metropolitan merchants 
dispatched to thirty different merchants at Quebec forty-seven loads varying 
in size from one small bale of general merchandise to ten bales and two 
barriques of general wares, two quarts and one ancre of nails, one packet 
of steel, one case of muskets and ten barrels of lead. At each end of the 
maritime link both large and small commercial houses were represented. 
Undoubtedly there were even some consignments sent not to merchants but 
to clients in the colony for their own consumption. Fully one-half the space 
was taken by one of the owners, Jean-Jacques Catignon, whose major 
consignment went to Jean Crespin, already colonel de la mi/ice at Quebec 
and soon to become a councillor on the Superior Council. 20 
The captain sold the owners' cargo for slightly more than twice its 
original value (see Table VI). Nearly half the amount was received in colonial 
goods and the remainder in specie and bills of exchange drawn on commercial 
houses and institutions in France. Almost one-third of their cargo was 
purchased by Mme. Soumande, widow of a prominent local merchant. In 
return for 200 minots of salt, 50 barriques of wine and 3621h velts of brandy 
valued at 6,987 livres 10 sols, she exchanged 23 packets of moose and deer 
hides, two bales of lynx and bearskins all valued at 5,537 livres 10 sols. 
Mme. Soumande made up the difference with a bill of exchange and 753 livres 
in cash. 21 This was a typical exchange between colonial and metropolitan 
merchants in that Mme. Soumande needed to make over ten percent of her 
payment in cash. For in general the colonists were unable to supply colonial 
goods for the full equivalent of French goods delivered to them. Captain 
Chiron took more than 3,000 livres in coin out of the colony as a result 
of his single trading operation, which provides a good illustration of the 
constant difficulty the Canadian colonists had in paying for their manufac-
tures (see Table VIII). In view of this flow of specie eastward across the 
Atlantic we shall not be surprised to learn that the specie was devalued on 
arrival in France. 
Almost four thousand livres from the sale of goods remained in New 
France in the form of duties levied on wine and brandy, loading and 
20 Rapport de l'archiviste de la province de Quebec, 1949-1951, p. 285, "notice 
biographique." Crespin's close relations with the owners is revealed in the captain's 
instructions to seek him out for advice when confronted by any business problems. 
21 A.C.M., B 4202, "Madame Soumande, son compte courant avec Capitaine 
Chiron de la Rochelle." 
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lightering costs, and expenditures for revictualling (see Table VII). In all, 
the captain returned with goods, coin and bills which eventually realized 
17,955 livres 1 sol 6 deniers in La Rochelle. When added to the amounts 
earned from carrying freight in both directions the total gross earnings of 
the ship amounted to 25,556 livres 14 sols (see Table X). This figure 
represents earnings from both trading and shipping. 
The proportion of one type of earning from the other is significant. 
Only 29.3 percent of the total earnings were derived from freight. Slightly 
more than seventy percent of the earnings came from selling about 54 percent 
of the total cargo carried. To have earned a similar amount on freight alone 
the Fier would have had to carry 256 tons of cargo, or in other words had 
a full lacting while sailing to and from New France (see Table XTI). There 
was little or no hope of earning sufficient profits from shipping activity alone. 
It was probably a characteristic that shippers customarily owned a large 
portion of the cargo being carried on ships sailing to New France, that trading 
activity was an integral part of the growth of maritime activity in the colony, 
and that the shipper-traders from France occupied a paramount position. 
In order to obtain a complete picture of the commercial venture under 
discussion see Tables V to X. The value of the figures in the tables is that 
they show the earnings of the outbound cargo, the reduction in the quantity 
of items sold at Quebec from that loaded at La Rochelle, the devaluation 
of specie and the failure of the return cargo to earn any profit. The striking 
feature is the difference between the earnings of the French and Canadian 
cargos. Purchased at La Rochelle for 9,781 livres 2 sols 8 deniers, the cargo 
sold at Quebec for 21,482 livres 2 sols (Colonial value), an increase of 
ninety-three percent after the currency equivalent is taken into account. 
By comparison, the cargo purchased at Quebec for 17 ,538 livres 6 sols 
10 deniers (Colonial) sold at La Rochelle for 17,596 livres 13 sols 1 denier 
(tournois), an increase of only fifteen percent. As in the case of freight the 
merchant had to count on the earnings of the outbound run to provide his 
profits. 22 
It may be objected that in 1725 specie no longer circulated in the French 
colonies at higher fixed rates than in France. But nevertheless Estournel 
made a devaluation of 12.5 percent on the coins after they arrived in La 
Rochelle, and this illustrates another feature of the finances of the period 
which, together with the refusal by the central government to permit card 
money to circulate, led to the demoralization and decline of trade in the 
colony. According to letters patent issued and put into effect by order of 
the Conseil de Marine in April, 1717 all different rates at which specie 
circulated in the empire were abolished. Henceforth the coin of the realm 
was to circulate equally within the empire. Economic circumstances, how-
ever, dictated otherwise. Owing to the failure of the Crown to meet its 
financial obligations and to the collapse of John Law's "System," the govern-
22 By considering the equivalent, the profits from the outbound voyage were 
reduced, but those from the homebound trip were increased, over the apparent rates. 
86 HISTOIRE SOCIALE - SOCIAL HISTORY 
ment pushed through a bewildering series of specie devaluations during the 
next decade. Financial stability was not achieved in France until June, 1726, 
when Cardinal Fleury, who then became chief minister, insisted that the 
devaluations cease. The rate set then did not change until 1785. 
Until 1726, then, the devaluations always placed the colonial merchants 
at a disadvantage in their dealings with their metropolitan counterparts. 
Currency was always over-valued in New France. 23 In the case of the 
trading which originated from the voyage of the Fier, the colonists followed 
the rates set for specie in an arret of September, 1724, which had established 
the Louis d'or 'at 16 livres. By the time the Fier had returned to La Rochelle 
another arret of September, 1725, had further reduced the Louis d'or to 
14 livres. 24 Estoumel devalued the specie accordingly. 25 
A second significant feature, made all the more important by the 
profit-earning role of the outbound voyage, was the decline in the size of the 
cargo sold relative to the cargo initially laded in France. For instance, of 
the forty-five barriques of Saintonge wine carried, only twenty-seven were 
sold. Every other item in the cargo was in a similar case. A statement of 
the "coullage" [sic], or leakage, reveals that an eighteenth century merchant 
expected to absorb fairly high losses through spoilage, leakage and breakage; 
in the case just mentioned, this amounted to forty percent. 26 The type of 
commodity seems to have little bearing upon the degree of loss, for while 
the Saintonge registered the highest rate, the Bordeaux registered the lowest, 
which was not more than three percent. On an average, eleven percent of 
the wine was lost, and ten percent brandy and drinking glasses. The earthen-
ware suffered heavily, with losses amounting to twenty-two percent of the 
total while, not unexpectedly, the relatively indestructible ironware experi-
enced losses of only three percent. These losses show how the historian 
may easily be misled if he only compares the per unit prices in France with 
those in the colony without taking into consideration the losses which the 
merchant trader was expected to absorb and (before 1726) the specie 
devaluations in the calculation of his selling price. 27 
23 A. SHORTT, ed., Documents relating the Canadian currency, exchange and 
finance during the Ftench regime, 2 vols. (Ottawa, 1925), 1:375-93 for the letters patent; 
some of the devaluation arrets are also included. 
24 Ibid., I: 529 and 551, n. 1. 
25 Brouillard, page 29. The owners had to make this currency calculation only 
for the specie brought back to France. Due to the usual commercial practice of 
keeping accounts in local currencies no other reduction was required. Cargo was 
sold and purchased at Quebec at the prevailing rate. In attempting to determine profit 
on the items t raded, rather than on the whole venture, however, it was necessary to 
use a common rate and so reduce the prices in New France to livres tournois. If this 
was not done the profit rates would have appeared to be 12.5 percent higher than 
those given. 
26 A.C.M., The previously cited "Esta! de la vente de la cargaison . . . " included 
a statement of coulage. It reveals that cargo could sometimes be used by the crew for 
victuals,' as was the case for an ancre of vinegar, or could disappear completely as did 
a barrique of Bordeaux which was found to be empty on arrival at Quebec. 
27 Salt was measured in muids, boisseaux and minots which themselves varied 
according to the items being measured. The Fier carried thirty-four muids or 1632 
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Wine and brandy carried an additional burden of entry duties. These 
had been set in the seventeenth century at ten percent of their sale value 
at Quebec but in the present instance were levied at a fixed rate of nine livres 
per barrique of wine and twenty-two and a half livres for a similar quantity 
of brandy. In this venture 2,195 livres 3 sols 4 deniers were paid into the 
coffers of the Domaine d'Occident at Quebec. When the duty is compared 
to the price received after the sale of the wine and brandy, the duty appears 
to represent nearly twelve percent of the amount received. This suggests 
that the prices obtained were not as high as might have been expected. 2 8 
Before the net profit to the owners of the wine and brandy can be 
determined, the carriage charges must be added. These were hidden in the 
outfitting costs, but rather than attempt to fix a portion of those costs against 
the cargo, it seems reasonable to use the prevailing freight rates. Wine and 
brandy occupied 50 7 / 12 tons of cargo space. At one hundred livres per 
ton a charge of 5,058 livres 6 sols 8 deniers must be put against the earnings 
from the sale at Quebec. By subtracting the sum of the original cost and 
the carriage charges from the sale price less the duties levied, and taking 
into consideration the difference between current metropolitan and colonial 
currency values, we establish that the merchants were left with a net profit 
from the sale of wine and brandy of ten percent. 
The remainder of the outbound cargo of salt, vinegar and household 
wares, amounting to approximately fifteen tons, was worth 1,372 livres 
12 sols 8 deniers and earned 2,587 livres 14 sols in equivalent livres 
tournois. 29 After freight charges were deducted this portion of the cargo 
resulted in a net loss of ten percent to the owners. Certainly these figures 
are only approximate. The amount of space occupied by these items remains 
unknown except for the drinking glasses. They were packed in four quarts, 
or half a ton, and the proceeds from their sale resulted in a net loss of 
twenty-three and a half percent. The most profitable item was the iron pots. 
We do not know their bulk but they were transported for other merchants 
at a flat rate of thirty livres for forty and forty-eight units respectively. Even 
allowing for the currency equivalent it is possible that the owners realized 
a net profit of slightly more than thirty percent. The thirty-four muids of 
salt occupied 111/3 tons of cargo space, but as only about one quarter of the 
total was sold the remainder may have been carried as ballast and would 
not have had a charge levied against it. In that case the freight charge of 
1,500 livres determined for the additional cargo is far too high and the 
loss exaggerated. Nevertheless the case of the glassware must be considered 
against such a view. 
minots of which only 443 were sold. There are several possible explanations of this 
fact anyone of which is probable, but the lack of any indication has forced an exclusion 
of this discrepancy of seventy-three percent from these calculations. Cf. Encyclopedie, 
X:558 "muid ." 
28 A.C.M., B 4202, "A cquit de payment du Bureau de Quebec," 15 Oct., 1725. 
The duties on 1 barrique that was not sold, but was presented to the governor, have 
been substracted from the above calculation. 
29 The actual price received at Quebec was 2,957 livres 7 sols. 
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Turning to the return cargo (see Tables VIII and IX) the results reveal 
the third major feature of the trading portion of the venture. The total 
cargo obtained in New France was disbursed at La Rochelle for about fifteen 
percent more than was paid for it at Quebec. This figure included not only 
colonial products, but also specie and bills of exchange. When exchange 
commodities are considered alone the picture is enlightening. Cod fish, 
wood products, furs and hides purchased for 10,764 livres 14 sols (9,420.1 
livres tournois) sold in France for 11,226 livres, an increase of nineteen 
percent. The greater the amount of colonial products laded, the better the 
financial picture. But this gross figure could not begin to pay for the 
operational costs of the ship let alone yield significant profit. The largest item 
of the return cargo, cod, occupied less than ten tons of cargo space. The 
earnings on the return freight amounted to no more than 1,455 livres. Even 
if the return rates were lower than those for the outbound voyage, it is 
doubtful whether the freight totaled to more than eighteen or twenty tons. 
The ship probably carried no more than forty tons of cargo across the 
Atlantic; and it is not surprising that at least one street in La Rochelle is 
paved with ballast stones from Canada. 
Although the Fier' s return cargo consisted of Canadian products that 
"helped to provide France with the raw materials which she needed", it 
would be completely erroneous to see in this traffic, as one student has 
done, an opportunity to "double profits" compared to those being earned 
for a single crossing of the Atlantic. 30 These Canadian products bore no 
resemblance to sugar or tobacco which were valuable enough to bear high 
freight rates and to pay for outbound as well as inbound voyages. Furs 
could carry high freight rates, but even during the most prosperous years 
of the ancien regime all the furs exported from the colony in any one year 
could be carried in one good-sized merchantman. 31 It seems doubtful, indeed, 
whether furs can really be considered a staple in the same sense as tobacco 
or sugar. 
Tobacco and sugar were bulky valuable cargoes which could earn large 
profits. When a ship was under charter to carry bulk cargoes homeward, 
it presumably provided the owners with their main earnings, but there was 
nothing to prevent them from shipping their own cargoes on the outward 
run like the owners of the Fier. In other colonies shippers could expect to 
earn profits from transporting in two directions. 
In Europe it was not unusual for a shipper to earn a profit by transport-
ing a cargo in only one direction. But it may well have been the exception 
in colonial shipping where distances were greater, navigation less certain 
30 A . G. REID, "Intercolonial Trade during the French Regime," Canadian 
Historical Review, XXXII (1951), 236, 248. 
31 A. J. E. LUNN, "Economic Development in New France, 1713-1760" (Un" 
published Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1942), p. 456 for estimates of annual fur 
exports after 1716. 
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and the risk generally increased. The triangular trade routes which developed 
between several colonies might best be viewed as attempts to improve the 
earning power of ships by moving cargo for a profit along two sides of a 
triangle rather than as the outgrowth of a desire to exchange mutually 
beneficial commodities between temporate and tropical colonies. It is notable 
for instance, that New England, with an economy somewhat similar to that 
of New France, developed triangular trade routes with the West Indies, 
whereas Virginia, with a bulk cargo export commodity, provided shippers 
with the opportunity to earn profits by moving goods in both directions 
directly between the colony and England, no time being wasted moving 
along an unprofitable route. 
In New France, on the other hand, shippers and owners had to forego 
such expectations. The return cargo for most was not a means to increase 
earnings, but a necessary result of the barter system employed wherein one 
commodity was exchanged for another. Despite the existence of about a 
hundred tons of empty cargo capacity on the voyage home, the owners made 
no attempt to fill it. Profits were earned by transporting goods from the 
mother country to the colony and selling them to the inhabitants. There was 
little profit to be had from carrying Canadian products to France. 
Several questions arise from this examination of the owners' cargo. 
In view of the great difference between profit and loss on certain items, 
were the earnings on non-luxury goods sufficient to justify their carriage to 
New France at all? The answer seems to be a qualified yes, but only 
provided that luxury items made up the bulk of a cargo and that no other 
goods were available to a shipper. It was certainly better to carry something 
if only to reduce the carriage costs of the luxury goods. 
This in no way implies that manufactures of daily use were not carried 
to the colony. Historians have recently found evidence that during the ancien 
regime large quantities of French manufactured goods especially clothes, 
were present in New France, among the common people. 32 The failure of 
return cargoes to earn profit in the traffic with New France poses the 
additional question not just whether the colonial merchants ever dominated 
the trade, but whether they ever could have dominated the maritime trade 
and traffic between New France and the mother country given additional 
adverse factors of climate and geography. Does not the picture portrayed 
suggest a reason for the little enthusiasm shown by merchants in New 
France to accept molasses from the Antilles in exchange for local products ? 
Can there be any wonder at the vigorous reactions displayed on any occasion 
when the suppression of liquor in the fur trade was discussed ? Did the low 
profit margins on household goods - iron pots excepted - lead to their 
being imported by colonial merchants rather than metropolitan merchants ? 
32 See R.-L. Sfou1N, Le costume civil en Nouv elle-France, Musee national du 
Canada, Bulletin 215, Ottawa, 1968. 
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Unfortunately on this point we have perhaps carried our speculation beyond 
what the evidence will bear. Certainly profits were sufficient to encourage 
merchants to venture into the colonial trade of New France, but the margin 
was narrow enough to bring about many failures. The Canadian trade was 
not a gateway to instant riches. Knowledge, experience and not a little luck 
were keys to commercial success on the route to New France. 
v 
It has been useful thus far to divide the total capital outlay into three 
parts; the fixed cost, the replacement cost and the amount invested in the 
cargo. The returns from this last portion of the outlay we have considered 
in some detail for they lead to conclusions regarding trade to New France. 
It remains now to examine the earning of the maritime and trading portions 
of the venture considered as a whole and to determine net earnings. But 
this cannot be done without first making three final calculations of factors 
in the fixed cost element of the ship's capital. They are the depreciation of 
the ship, the insurance risk against loss or peril of the sea and the interest 
on the capital investment represented in the fixed cost. 
It was in order to arrive at some approximate idea of these elements 
that I attempted earlier to distinguish between building a ship and making 
it ready for sea. The division of capital into two parts arose from the 
great difference in the longevity of the portions thus split, and hence in 
determining the rate of depreciation of the two parts of the investment. 
Only the first portion depreciated very slowly. A wooden ship that had 
been properly maintained and which sailed in northern waters might last 
beyond the quarter century mark, even to the half century although this 
was unlikely. Nevertheless the fixed portion of the outlay had to be depre-
ciated at between two and four percent annually. This figure naturally 
increased when, as in the case of the Fier, the ship did not sail to New 
France every year and was laid up in her home port, continually losing 
value without earning any profits. The Fier did not sail again from La 
Rochelle until the spring of 1729. 
The other portion of the outlay in the ship was not depreciated at all 
but was considered along with victuals and advances as replacement expen-
diture. Not all of the replacements were made every year, but at frequent 
intervals. Also, the ratio between the two kinds of outlay fixed: replacement 
was 3: 2. In attempting to find a rate of depreciation for the whole amount 
needed to get the ship ready for sea the figure of four percent seems to be 
on the high side. 33 Applying this rate to the Fier, the depreciation charge 
would have amounted to 1,000 livres. 
The element of risk is even more difficult to estimate. One could well 
imagine that special rates existed on voyages to New France where long 
33 R. DAVIS, "Earning of capital ... ," p. 411. 
THE VOYAGE OF THE FIER ... 91 
periods of close navigation were involved in the confines of the Saint 
Lawrence River and where delayed departures increased the danger from 
ice and snow, but no such development seems to have occurred. Like the 
differences between old and new ships, other factors served to balance the 
risks on any particular trade route in peacetime. Nevertheless French marine 
insurance rates were high, higher than in either England or the Netherlands, 
and this prevented the owners from insuring their whole investment. The 
high rates were due to the failure of any central clearing house to develop 
and to the control of Parisian underwriters who were notorious for their 
delays and their failure to pay claims. In the third decade of the eighteenth 
century the merchants of La Rochelle depended largely on their own and 
other merchant communities to insure their vessels and were naturally unable 
to deal in low rates. The owners of the Fier insured their venture at the 
rate of ten percent of the coverage, which was high even for France. Conse-
quently they only took out protection for 16,000 livres on both the ship 
and the cargo. It is probably no accident that this amount covered the 
fixed cost value of the ship. 
The reduction in coverage may have been made in order to bring the 
risk into closer agreement with the rate of loss in French shipping which 
was considerably lower than ten percent and to give a more accurate reflection 
of reality. In determining the English rate of loss, five percent has been 
suggested as a reasonable, if largely approximate figure. 34 There seems 
no reason not to use the same rough figure in the French instance. Also, 
16,000 livres represents forty-six percent of the total gross capital outlay, 
on the ship and cargo. By covering this percentage of their investment at 
the high rate of ten percent, the French owners may have been estimating 
the real risk at a loss rate of approximately 4.6 percent and compensating 
for it, thereby refusing to overinsure their venture. 
The third element, the interest on the capital invested in fixed cost, 
is the sum of the insurance, 4.6 percent of the total investment or 1,600 livres 
(1,600 livres was the actual premium paid), and the depreciation of the 
fixed cost, 645.6 livres in the first year of operation. In the years to come 
the owners would diminish the accumulated depreciation charge by a similar 
amount after each voyage. The total from this addition had to be earned 
each year, more if the voyages took place at greater intervals, before there 
was any return on the investment. In the case of the Fier, approximately 
6.5 percent of the total capital outlay, or 2,245 livres went toward deprecia-
tion and provision for sea risks before any interest or profit became available 
to the owners. It is significant in this respect that the Fier's insurance 
premium was not paid until four months after the ship's return from Quebec. 35 
The foregoing estimates cannot pretend to a high degree of accuracy, 
but the main point of the exercise has been to show that the amount involved 
34 R. DAVIS, "Earning of capital ... ," p. 411. 
35 Brouillard, fol. 45. 
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was considerable and must not be ignored. No record of such calculatiom 
have been discovered but this was to be expected in a period when fixed 
assets in commercial enterprises were a novelty. Nevertheless in the eigh-
teenth century merchants must have begun making such calculations in order 
to consider the feasibility of commercial ventures of the kind undertaken by 
the Pier, which included fixed assets. 
The total earnings from the Pier's voyage to Quebec amounted to 
25,556 livres 14 sols. After all the deductions are made (see Table XI) net 
earnings of 4,640 livres 3 sols 6 deniers were obtained from a capital outlay 
of 34,777 livres 9 sols 8 deniers, or a return of approximately 13.3 percent 
was realized on the owners' investment. By this time, however, the initial 
investment had been reduced to the fixed cost element of the ship, or by less 
than fifty percent of the total. The question remains why the owners, or 
anyone else, were willing to accept such small returns for such risky invest-
ment as ocean shipping, compared with rentes yielding between three and 
five percent annually, the profits from this venture were not enormous. When 
the risks of the two kinds of investment are compared, the question only 
increases in significance. 
Several reasons have been suggested which indicate why the shipping 
industry attracted capital and grew in France throughout the eighteenth 
century. At that time merchants did not depreciate their fixed assets, and 
therefore they might consider a ship's earnings to be larger than was the 
case, but in the example of the Fier, the failure to determine depreciation 
would raise net earnings on investment only slightly to 15.2 percent of the 
total outlay. Nevertheless, as in the case of the Pier, the combination of 
trading with shipping gave the forwarder greater control and security over 
his goods while en route to their destination and permitted him to set depar-
ture and arrival dates with greater accuracy so as to avoid tying up large 
amounts of capital in unprofitable waiting periods. Convenience might well 
encourage merchant traders to own their own ships especially in the New 
France trade where margins appeared so narrow. It has already been 
suggested that it was nearly impossible to earn a profit through shipping 
alone. Also, the position of the co-owner who outfitted the Pier is revealing. 
Although the capital outlay was equally owned by three men, Andre Estournel 
alone outfitted the ship. He charged himself and his co-owners a commission 
of two percent on 35,173 livres for his services. Thus, in addition to his share 
of one-third of the net earnings (1,860 livres), he also received 702 livres 
for outfitting the venture. 36 Finally the figures in Table XII reveal the 
manner in which shippers could obtain significant returns. Pier's voyage 
took approximately 6.75 months to complete during which time 13.1 percent 
profit was realized on the investment. The estimated annual rate of return, 
however, was nearly double that figure. Thus, the ship owner made significant 
36 See MEYER, L'Armement nantais, pp. 154-7, for a discussion of the significant 
profits earned by armateurs above those of other co-owners. 
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returns when he was able to re-invest his capital as rapidly as possible. 
Every delay, however, cut into his ability to profit from his venture. As 
the Fier did not sail again until 1729, the annual rate of return might be 
said to have dropped to a mere 3.4 percent when spread over four years. 
Nevertheless, ship owning could be quite attractive to individuals who were 
willing to pay attention to their ventures and exploit every available 
opportunity. 
Perhaps the nature of shipowning also provides a partial explanation. 
Ships became a source for the investment of surplus capital. Shares in ships, 
unlike ordinary commercial partnerships, were freely transferable and there 
was a considerable market for them. 37 The dangers of non-limited partner-
ships generally were not as great on the continent as they were in England, 
but the limited amount of the total capital outlay was attractive everywhere. 
Shipowning represented a lin1ited liability operation in two senses. First, 
unlike ordinary commercial partnerships shipping ventures were for relatively 
short terms and had a specific object in view. Second, a ship represented 
in its fixed cost a tangible asset, a piece of property with a low rate of 
depreciation. The only liability to be registered against it would be wages 
which would hardly exceed the value of the ship. In the case of cargo 
liability it could be assumed iliat were the ship to be lost the liability would 
be covered by insurance. In practice, then, shipowning was a form of 
limited liability in a period when such a form of investment was almost 
unheard of, and attractive to surplus capital despite possible low rates of 
return. 
Finally, unlike most commercial partnerships of the period in which 
capital outlay was tied up in goods to be exchanged, the ship represented 
a very large lump sum investment which held out possibilities, given the 
right combination of circumstances, of great gains through fluctuating freight 
rates. This was a distinct advantage over the normal commercial partnership 
that had very little fixed element. In the ordinary course of events most of 
the capital went into exchangeable commodities with a consequent higher 
rate of risk on return. 
It has recently been argued iliat the distinctive feature of eighteenth 
century French capitalism was its lack of fixed assets and that maritime 
voyages were viewed as joint ventures at the end of which the ship was 
sold and the loss or profit from this transaction entered into the total 
statement of the voyage. 38 This was undoubtedly ilie normal case and 
because of the absence of fixed assets eighteenth century books of_ account 
contain no evidence of the concept of depreciation. But it must by now 
37 DAVIS, "Earnings of capital ... ," p. 424, refers to England, but MEYER, 
L'Armement nantais, provides many French examples. 
38 G. V. TAYLOR, "Types of Capitalism in Eighteenth Century France," English 
Historical Review, LXXIV (1964), 478-501, see especially p. 483 . TAYLOR continues 
his discussion in "Non-capitalist wealth and the Origins of the French Revolution," 
American Historical Review, LXXIII (1967), 469-96. 
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be clear that the Fier was not a short term asset to its owners. The ownership 
of the Fier represents something new in the development of capitalism. May 
not it and shipowning generally represent an intermediary step in the develop-
ment from commercial to industrial capital investment ? If so, we have yet 
another reason why investors or merchants were not deterred from entering 
shipping activities. Even so the case of Fier illustrates the need for these 
individuals to pursue their activities with great care in order to avoid losses. 
TABLES OF EXPENDITURE AND REVENUE 
RELATING TO THE VOYAGE OF THE FIER TO QUEBEC IN 1725 
(all figures are in French livres, sols and deniers) 
Wood 1 
Pitch, Tar and Oakum 
Masts and Spars 
Table I: TOTAL COST OF MATERIAL 
Nails, Ironware and Fixtures 
Miscellaneous fixed expenditures 
Rigging and Running gear 
Rope and Cordage 
Sails 
Miscellaneous replacement expenditure 2 
TOTAL 
Table II: TOTAL CosT OF LABOUR 
Sailors, 557 116 days @ 30 sols each 
Carpenters, 3 1,469 516 days @ 30 sols each 
foldiers (unskilled), 89 days @ 20 sols each 
Gardien during refit 
Artisans (fixed cost) 
Artisans (replacement cost) 
Towing, Haulage and Transportation 
TOTAL 
Hull (purchase price) 
Materials 
Labour 
Miscellaneous 4 
TOTAL 
Table III: TOTAL CAPITAL OUTLAY 
3.414 
510 
529 
1,913 
276 
1,270 
2,090 
940 
966 
11,913 
761 
2,395 
94 
73 
488 
276 
165 
4,454 
4,600 
11,916 
4,454 
365 
21,333 
1 This sum includes l, 112 livres for oak planks and some pitch and tar. 
17/6 
18 
12 
19 
14 
15 
8/4 
3/10 
5 
18/6 
8/6 
16 
8 
3/10 
8 
11 
2/10 
2 This represents an arbitrary attempt to separate those items which last for 
only one or two voyages from more permanent fixtures of construction.. 
3 Ship's carpenters' wages in New France were considerably higher than those 
in La Rochelle. In 173 5 master shipbuilders were paid between sixty and seventy 
livres per month, or 2Vz livres per day; at the same time unskilled labour earned 
30 sols per day. A.N., Col., CllA, CXIV, f. 9. 
4 Includes rent of a berth and expenditure made while away from La Rochelle 
in search of materials. 
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Table IV : TOTAL CAPITAL OUTLAY OF THE OWNERS 
Fixed cost of the Fier 
Replacement cost of the Fier 5,543 17/ 4 
Ship's victuals<> 2,247 4/2 
Advances to the crew 1,416 
Total Replacement cost 
Cost of Cargo onboard 
TOTAL 
Table V: VALUE OF THE SHIP'S CARGO 
PURCHASED AT LA ROCHELLE 
34 Muids salt @ 8#5slmuid 
40 Tonneaux Bordeaux @ 135#/tx. 
11 ~ Tonneaux Saintonge @ 110# / tx. 
8 grosses barriques and 28 quarts brandy 
@ 66# / barrique of 27 velts 
8 Quarts vinegar 
60 Dozen pieces of Earthenware 
55 Dozen drinking glasses in 4 quarts 
296 Cooking pots and 300 each covers and handles 
TOTAL 
Table VI: VALUE OF THE OWNERS' CARGO 
SOLD AT QUEBEC 
443 Minors salt @ 45s & 50s! minot 
155 Barriques Bordeaux @ 80# ! barrique 
27 Barriques Saintonge @ 50# & 60# I barrique 
640~ Velts Brandy @ 7# & 8# / velt 
61/2 Quarts Vinegar @ 30# I quart 
47 Dozen pieces of Earthenware @ 4# lOs and 4# / 5s/ dozen 
49 1h Dozen drinking glasses @ 3·6s, 40s, 45s and 50s/ dozen 
287 Cooking pots, covers and handles @ 5# each 
TOTAL 
Table VII : TOTAL EXPENDITURES MADE AT QUEBEC 
Value of cargo purchased at Quebec 
Duties paid on Wine and Brandy 
Revictualling charges 
Lightering and Lading costs 
TOTAL 
15,789 
9,207 
9,781 
34,778 
280 
5,400 
1,237 
l,771 
90 
144 
82 
775 
9,781 
1,001 
12,400 
1,590 
4,534 
195 
218 
107 
1,435 
21,482 
17,438 
2,195 
1,534 
204 
21,473 
95 
516 
1/ 6 
218 
9/ 8 
10 
10 
10 
10/8 
218 
10 
15 
15 
2 
2 
6/ 10 
3/4 
18 / 10 
13 
2 
5 The cost of revictualling the ship at Quebec, 1,534 livres 18 sols 10 deniers, 
is not included as part of the capital outlay but as a charge against earnings. This 
only arose, however, because the owners loaded their own cargo. In another instance 
the owners would have had to give the captain this amount to purchase supplies for 
the return voyage and thus increase their investment. 
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Table VIII: VALUE OF OwNERs' CARGO 
PURCHASED AT QUEBEC 
188 Quintals of Dry Cod @ 14#/quintal 
Planks, Staves and Caskwood 
3 Bales of Mixed Furs 
23 Packets and 2 Parcels of Hides 
64 Louis d'or, 550 Ecus & monnaye 
10 Bills of Exchange 
TOTAL 
Table IX: VALUE OF OwNERS' CARGO 
SoLD AT LA ROCHELLE 
180 Quintals of Dry Cod 6@ 15#, 16# & 21#/quintal 
Planks, Staves and Caskwood 
3 Bales of Mixed Furs 
Moose and Deer Hides 
64 Louis d'or and 550 Ecus diminished by I/8th of their value 
in France 
10 Bills of Exchange 
TOTAL 
Table X : GROSS EARNINGS FROM THE VOYAGE 
Total Value of Owners' cargo sold at La Rochelle 
Additional amounts realized from other sales 1 
Freight earned outbound 
Freight earned inbound s 
TOTAL 
Table XI : NET EARNINGS FROM mE VOYAGE 
Gross Earnings 
Deductions: Cost of Original Cargo 
Provisions for depreciation and 
Sea Risk 
Replacement costs (victuals and 
crew's advance) 
Post-voyage expenses 9 
Duties and Charges at La Rochelle 
TOTAL 
9,781 
2,245 
6,982 
1,825 
82 
2/8 
14/2 
10/10 
2/10 
2,632 
1,480 19 
903 15 
5,748 
3,224 9/10 
3,549 3 
17,538 6/ 10 
3,394 2 
2,188 12 
1,248 5 
4,395 1/3 
2,821 9/10 
3,549 3 
17,596 13/1 
17,596 13/1 
358 8/5 
6,146 12/6 
1,455 
25,556 14 
25,556 14 
20,916 10/6 
4,640 3/6 
6 The discrepancy between the two amounts is explained by the five percent 
normally deducted for "bon poid et trait," the figure given includes 380 livres weight 
of scraps sold to a street vender in the port at 8# / quintal . 
7 This amount includes prices received for one of the ship's pumps, a broken 
mast sold for use elsewhere as a bowsprit, and 2,736 livres weight of used rope sold 
to oakum pickers. 
s Freight inbound was earned on the carriage of mixed furs worth 21,362 livres 
10 sols laded at Quebec for other merchants. (See waste-book, f. 28.) Cargo is noted 
in A.C.M., Serie B, 4202, "Estat des pelleteries chargees a fret dans le navire Le Fier 
cap•• Chiron venant de Quebec." 
9 It may seem unreasonable to include this amount but most of these expenses 
occurred immediately after the ship's return and include fresh food for the crew, 
lightering costs, disarmament and storage charges. 
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Table XII: ESTIMATED ANNUAL RAm OF RETURN 
Length of Voyage 
Total Capital Outlay 
Total Capital Outlay, less owners' cargo 
Gross Earnings 
Net Earnings 
Monthly Costs: Wages 
Victuals 
Ship Replacement 
Ship Fixed 
Monthly Gross Earnings 
Monthly Net Earnings 
Monthly rate of return on investment 
Estimated Annual Rate of Return 
701.6 livres 
322.9 livres 
339.5 livres 
2339.0 livres 
97 
6.75 months 
34,778.5 livres 
24,996.3 livres 
25,556.7 livres 
4,640.2 livres 
3703.0 livres 
3786.2 livres 
687.4 livres 
2.0 percent 
24.0 percent 
